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Glossary · Deal terms

Material adverse change (MAC/MAE)

The clause that lets a buyer walk away if something bad enough happens between signing and closing. It almost never works. A Delaware court first upheld one in 2018, after decades of trying.

Deal terms
Category
9 November 2026
Updated

In one sentence

The clause that lets a buyer walk away if something bad enough happens between signing and closing. It almost never works. A Delaware court first upheld one in 2018, after decades of trying.

What it is

A deal is signed in March and completes in October. The MAC clause answers a simple question about those seven months: if the business falls apart, does the buyer still have to pay?

The gap it covers is not small. On large transactions it is measured in years: Marvell agreed to acquire Lumentum in November 2026 and expects to close in the first half of 2028, which we wrote about in signing is not closing.

Why it almost never works

Buyers invoke MAC clauses in difficult markets. Courts have been reluctant to let them.

In Akorn v Fresenius (2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery found an MAE had occurred and allowed the buyer to terminate: reported at the time as the first occasion a Delaware court had permitted a buyer to walk from a public company merger on that basis.1 That it took until 2018 is the single most useful fact about these clauses.

What it took to get there:

Akorn
Revenue, 2017−25%
Operating income−105%
Earnings per share−113%
Duration by the time of trialWell over a year

The court also found a separate regulatory MAE: fixing Akorn’s regulatory and quality-control failures was estimated at more than $900m, roughly 20% of the transaction value.2

Compare what was not enough:

  • Hexion (2008): a projected one-year EBITDA decline of 3.6% against the position at signing. Insufficient.
  • IBP (2001): a sharp fall, but in a cyclical business and partly weather-driven, which subsided. The court wanted a decline consequential to earning power “over a commercially reasonable period”, measured in years rather than months.

The carve-outs are the clause

Almost all the drafting effort goes into what is excluded. A typical MAC definition carves out:

  • general economic, financial or market conditions
  • conditions affecting the industry generally
  • changes in law, regulation or accounting standards
  • the effect of announcing or performing the deal itself
  • acts of war, terrorism, natural disaster, pandemic
  • anything disclosed to or known by the buyer before signing

Those carve-outs are then usually qualified: they apply unless the target is disproportionately affected compared with others in its industry. That qualification is where the negotiation actually lands, because it converts the clause from “did something bad happen?” into “did something bad happen specifically to this business?”

What actually protects a buyer in the gap

Because MAC clauses are so hard to invoke, the real protection sits elsewhere, and Akorn illustrates it. The court found an independent ground for termination: the target had breached its obligation to carry on the business in the ordinary course between signing and closing.2

So the clauses worth reading closely are:

  1. The ordinary-course covenant. Easier to prove a breach of than an MAE, and in Akorn it stood on its own.
  2. Interim operating restrictions. What the target may not do without consent: capital spending, hiring, pricing, new contracts.
  3. Specific conditions. A named customer contract renewing, a licence being maintained, debt staying below a level. A specific condition beats a general one every time.
  4. Reverse termination fees. What the buyer pays if it walks. Often the real negotiation about walking away.

Common mistakes

  1. Relying on the MAC clause as the main protection. It is a backstop, not a remedy. Negotiate specific conditions for risks you can actually name.
  2. Ignoring the disproportionate-effect qualifier. It decides most arguments and gets the least attention.
  3. Assuming a bad market is a MAC. Market conditions are the first carve-out in almost every agreement.
  4. Sellers under-negotiating the carve-outs. Each one narrows the buyer’s exit. They are worth as much to a seller as the price protections.

Sources

  1. Jones Day, “Delaware Chancery Court Finally Finds an MAE” (October 2018), on Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG (Del. Ch. 2018). ↩

  2. Torys, “In a First, Delaware Finds Deal Properly Terminated Due to Material Adverse Effect” (October 2018). The financial measures, the separate regulatory MAE of more than $900m against a transaction value of roughly five times that, the ordinary-course breach as an independent ground, and the contrasts with Hexion and IBP. ↩ ↩2

Frequently asked questions

What is a material adverse change clause?

A condition in a purchase agreement allowing the buyer not to complete if the target suffers a material adverse change, or material adverse effect, between signing and closing. It is the main contractual answer to the risk that the business deteriorates during the gap between agreeing a deal and owning it.

How often do MAC clauses actually let a buyer walk?

Very rarely. In Akorn v Fresenius in 2018 the Delaware Court of Chancery found an MAE for the first time, which tells you how high the bar had been. Earlier attempts failed: in Hexion a projected one-year EBITDA decline of 3.6% was not enough, and in IBP a sharp but cyclical downturn was not either.

What is the legal test?

Delaware treats an MAE clause as a backstop against unknown events that substantially threaten the target's overall earnings potential in a durationally significant way. The decline has to be consequential to earning power over a commercially reasonable period, measured in years rather than months, and the burden sits on the buyer.

What is carved out of a MAC clause?

Usually general economic and market conditions, industry-wide changes, changes in law or accounting standards, the effect of announcing the deal, and anything the buyer already knew. Those carve-outs are heavily negotiated, and they are often qualified so they only apply where the target is not disproportionately affected compared with its peers.