Deal structure
Asset sale or share sale is not a technical question
Buyers want assets and sellers want shares, for the same reason: one of them leaves the history behind. Where that argument land…
9 November 2026 · 4 min
Every sponsor has a view on the debt market and most of them are two months stale. What lenders are actually clearing, as opposed to what they advertise.
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Financing
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Key takeaways
The most expensive form of ignorance in mid-market dealmaking is a stale view of the credit market. A sponsor pricing an asset off terms they were shown two quarters ago is either about to lose a process or about to win one they cannot fund.
The useful question to put to any lender is a simple one: what terms are you actually clearing, rather than the terms on your website?
The composition of mid-market acquisition finance has shifted decisively toward non-bank lenders, and the consequences are now well understood on both sides:
Certainty and speed have become the product. A direct lender offering a single-tranche facility, committed, with no syndication risk, competes against a bank club that may be cheaper on paper. In a competitive process, the sponsor who can promise the seller a short, unconditional timetable frequently wins the asset, and pays for that certainty in margin.
Documentation is where the real negotiation sits. Headline leverage and margin are reasonably transparent. What differentiates lenders now is the definition of EBITDA that leverage is measured against, the addback permissions, the covenant construction and its headroom, the permitted acquisition basket for add-ons, and the equity cure mechanics. A sponsor comparing two term sheets on margin alone is comparing the least important number.
Relationship pricing is real and rarely quoted. Lenders differentiate materially between a first-time borrower and a sponsor bringing their fourth platform. That difference does not appear in any market survey, which is one reason market surveys are unhelpful.
Consistent themes in how lenders describe their underwriting, stated as posture rather than as pricing:
EBITDA they can see, not EBITDA that has been argued for. Addback discipline has tightened. Pro forma synergies, run-rate savings from plans not yet executed and normalisation adjustments that require a narrative are being haircut or excluded. Leverage on adjusted EBITDA at a generous definition is not the same as leverage on cash flow, and lenders are now pricing the difference explicitly.
Fixed-charge coverage over leverage multiples. With a higher base rate, the binding constraint in many structures is no longer the leverage ratio but whether the business generates enough cash to service the debt and still fund its capex and working capital. Sponsors accustomed to solving for a leverage multiple are increasingly being told the answer is set by coverage.
Sector posture rather than sector exclusion. Very few sectors are formally off-limits, but appetite varies sharply: recurring-revenue businesses with genuinely contracted revenue and low churn remain well-bid; businesses with cyclical volume exposure, thin margins, project-based revenue recognition or exposure to a single regulatory decision are being asked to accept materially tighter structures or find equity instead.
Add-on capacity priced at the outset. For platform strategies, the permitted acquisition basket and the incremental facility mechanics matter more than the opening leverage. Sponsors who negotiate this well are able to execute add-ons without re-opening the credit agreement; sponsors who do not are back at the table with reduced leverage each time.
The question lenders ask that sponsors under-prepare for is not about the return. It is: if this business misses its plan by fifteen per cent in year two, what happens, and who puts money in?
The pushback from the equity side of the room clusters around three things.
Documentation drift is asymmetric. Terms that were negotiated hard in a competitive lending environment have been re-tightened, and sponsors argue that the tightening has gone beyond what the change in base rates justifies, particularly on EBITDA definitions and cure rights.
The hold-period arithmetic no longer resolves cleanly. Assets bought at higher entry multiples, financed at higher cost, need either multiple expansion or genuine earnings growth to hit a target return. Multiple expansion is not currently available on demand, which pushes the whole model onto operational improvement: a real change in what a sponsor has to be good at, and one that shows up in how funds are staffing.
Continuation vehicles and other liquidity routes are now standard rather than exceptional. Where an exit is not available at an acceptable price, sponsors are extending hold periods through structures that require their own diligence and their own governance conversation with LPs. This has become a normal part of the toolkit rather than a signal of distress, though the market still reads it inconsistently.
Run a genuine process on the debt. Two or three lenders, in parallel, with the same information pack. Sponsors who negotiate bilaterally pay for it, and the cost is usually in documentation rather than in margin.
Model the coverage constraint before the leverage constraint. If the deal only works at a leverage level your cash flow cannot service through a downside case, you do not have a financing problem. You have a price problem.
Negotiate the EBITDA definition line by line. It sets the leverage you get on day one, the headroom on the covenant, and the capacity for add-ons. It is the single most valuable page in the credit agreement.
Price the fees, all of them. Arrangement, commitment, ticking, prepayment, amendment. All-in cost over the expected hold, not headline margin, is the comparison that matters.
Ask what happens in the downside, and get the answer in writing. The character of a lender in a covenant conversation is the most important thing you will buy from them and the hardest thing to diligence. Ask the sponsors in your network who have been there.
General commentary on market practice. Not financial advice.
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