Skip to content
← Resources / Articles
Valuation3 min read

Sellers argue the multiple and lose on the add-backs

On a seven times multiple, a £400,000 EBITDA adjustment removes £2.8m of value and the multiple never moves. The negotiation that looks like accounting is the one that decides the price.

All M&A Research

Financial diligence

Updated
A person in a suit jacket holding a tablet showing figures.
A person in a suit jacket holding a tablet showing figures.

Key takeaways

  • The multiple is one number and gets all the attention. The adjustments are dozens of numbers, each multiplied by that same multiple, and they get argued by accountants rather than principals.
  • Adjustments run both ways. Genuine one-off costs and owner expenses that will not continue should be added back, but nobody will propose a seller's add-backs on their behalf.
  • Every add-back needs evidence, not an assertion. An invoice, a board minute, a contract or a salary benchmark is worth more than any amount of explanation.
  • Commission your own analysis before going to market, while there is still time to fix the issues it finds and alternative bidders to keep the buyer honest.

Every seller knows what multiple they want. Very few arrive at a process with a view on which adjustments to their EBITDA they will accept, which they will contest, and which they intend to propose themselves.

That allocation of attention is backwards, and it is expensive.

The arithmetic that explains everything

Price is a multiple applied to a measure of profit. Negotiating the multiple moves one variable. Negotiating the measure moves the thing the multiple is applied to.

A business reporting £2.5m of EBITDA, valued at seven times, is a £17.5m enterprise value. The buyer’s analysis removes £400,000, a one-off contract treated as recurring and an owner’s remuneration normalised to market, and £2.1m at seven times is £14.7m. The adjustment cost £2.8m, and nobody renegotiated the multiple.

Getting the multiple from 7× to 7.25× on £2.5m is worth £625,000. Defeating £400,000 of adjustments is worth £2.8m. One of those negotiations happens between principals over dinner; the other happens between accountants in a spreadsheet, and the seller is often not in the room.

They go both ways, and only one side is self-executing

A quality of earnings analysis will propose adjustments that reduce EBITDA.1 It is commissioned by the buyer, so this is unsurprising and not improper. Buyers and their lenders apply much the same logic the SEC applies to public-company adjusted measures: stripping out normal, recurring, cash operating expenses is misleading, and so is adjusting out one-off charges while leaving one-off gains in.2

Typically reducing EBITDA

  • Revenue recognised earlier than the work was performed
  • One-off or non-recurring income treated as ordinary
  • Under-accrued costs: holiday, bonuses, deferred repairs
  • Below-market owner remuneration, normalised upward as a cost
  • Customer concentration treated as though it were diversified

Typically increasing EBITDA

  • Genuine one-off costs: a legal dispute, a restructuring, an abandoned project
  • Owner costs that will not continue. A vehicle, family on the payroll, personal travel
  • Above-market related-party rent, where the property is also being sold
  • Costs of the sale process itself

The second list exists on almost every deal. It appears in the final figure only if someone puts it there, and that someone is not going to be the buyer’s accountant.

Evidence beats explanation

The difference between an add-back that survives and one that does not is almost never the strength of the argument. It is whether there is a document.

“That cost was a one-off” is a claim. The invoice, the board minute recording the decision, the settlement agreement and the absence of a comparable cost in the two prior years is evidence. One of those gets accepted in a diligence call; the other gets listed as “management assertion, unsupported” in a report the buyer’s investment committee reads.

Build the file before anyone asks. For each add-back: what it was, why it will not recur, and the document that proves both.

The adjustment you concede twice

There is a trap specific to working capital, and it catches sellers who have successfully defended their EBITDA.

The same diligence exercise that produces the adjusted EBITDA also produces the analysis behind the working capital peg and the schedule of debt-like items. A seller who has spent six weeks arguing about add-backs often concedes the peg basis without much resistance, on the reasonable view that the hard part is over.

It is not. The peg moves the price pound for pound and the debt-like schedule comes straight off the bridge to equity value. They are the same negotiation wearing different labels, and they should be argued together by the same people.

What to do about it

Commission your own analysis before going to market. The cost is small against the sums involved, and it buys three things that cannot be bought later: time to fix what it finds, evidence assembled without deadline pressure, and the ability to put your own adjustments on the table first rather than responding to someone else’s.

A seller who arrives at diligence with a documented bridge from reported to adjusted EBITDA is having a different conversation from one who arrives with a reported figure and a view on multiples.

Sources

  1. CBIZ, “Sell-Side Quality of Earnings: A Critical Part of Due Diligence”. ↩

  2. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Non-GAAP Financial Measures: Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations, Questions 100.01 and 100.03 (updated December 2022). ↩