Skip to content
← Resources / Articles
Valuation5 min read

The bid–ask spread that will not close

Sellers are still pricing off a cost of capital that no longer exists. Buyers are pricing off one that may not last. Most processes now die in the gap between them, and the bridges being used to cross it are quietly transferring risk to the seller.

All M&A Research

Valuation and deal structuring

Updated
High-rise office buildings under an overcast grey sky.
High-rise office buildings under an overcast grey sky.

Key takeaways

  • Buyers and sellers are often discounting the same cash flows at different costs of capital, which is a structural gap rather than a negotiating position.
  • Some of the gap is a story problem and can be closed with evidence. Some of it is structural and cannot be closed at all.
  • The bridges (earn-outs, deferred consideration, vendor loan notes, rollover equity) do not close the gap. They move who carries it.
  • A seller accepting a bridge is accepting contingency in place of price. Model what completes in cash before agreeing to one.

There is a particular silence that happens about six weeks into a sale process. The information memorandum has gone out, the indications have come back, and the owner is sitting with a number that is thirty per cent below what they had already spent in their head. Nobody has done anything wrong. The business is fine. The buyers are serious. And the deal is probably not going to happen at that price.

This is the most common conversation in mid-market M&A right now, and it is worth being precise about what is actually causing it, because sellers and buyers tend to diagnose it differently, and both diagnoses are partly self-serving.

Two different discount rates in the same room

The seller’s number usually comes from a comparable transaction. Often a good one: a real business, a real multiple, a real press release. The problem is when it closed. A multiple struck in a period of cheap leverage embeds a financing structure that is no longer available. The buyer of that comparable could put more debt on the business, at a lower cost, with looser documentation. They could therefore pay more equity-efficiently for the same cash flows.

The buyer’s number comes from what they can fund today. Work backwards from a target equity return, a realistic leverage quantum on genuinely defensible EBITDA, and today’s all-in cost of that debt, and the enterprise value that falls out is materially lower. Not because anyone thinks less of the business, because the capital structure that used to carry part of the price is no longer carrying it.

So both parties are being rational and neither is being persuadable, because they are not arguing about the business. They are arguing about the cost of money, and neither of them controls it.

The gap is not usually a disagreement about the company. It is a disagreement about what the next five years of capital will cost, dressed up as a disagreement about the company.

Where the gap is structural, and where it is a story problem

It matters enormously which of these you have, because only one of them is fixable inside a process.

A structural gap exists when the business’s cash flows genuinely cannot support the seller’s price under any financing available to a real buyer. No amount of positioning closes this. Sellers with a structural gap have three honest options. Accept a lower number, wait, or change the business: grow into the multiple, fix the customer concentration, professionalise the earnings so that a buyer can underwrite more of them.

A story problem exists when the buyer’s model is discounting something that is real but unproven in the data. Contracted revenue that looks like project revenue because of how it is invoiced. A pricing increase implemented four months ago that has not annualised. Owner compensation and personal expenses that suppress reported EBITDA. Two customers who churned for reasons that will not repeat. These gaps are frequently worth a turn or more of EBITDA, and they close in diligence rather than in negotiation, but only if the seller has the evidence assembled before the buyer builds their model, not after.

The practical implication is unglamorous: exit readiness work done twelve months early is worth more than any amount of negotiating skill applied in month six. By the time indications are in, the buyer’s number has an internal committee attached to it.

The bridges, and who is actually carrying them

When the gap is real and both sides still want the deal, the price gets bridged. There is a fairly consistent set of mechanisms for doing it, and it is worth being clear-eyed about what each one does to the seller’s risk.

Earn-outs

The most common bridge and the one most likely to disappoint. An earn-out converts part of the purchase price into a bet on a business you no longer control, measured by an accounting metric your buyer now defines. The recurring failure is not fraud. It is that a reasonable new owner makes reasonable decisions (a systems migration, a price change, a sales reorganisation) that happen to depress the earn-out metric. If you accept one, the negotiation that matters is not the headline number. It is the definition of the metric, the covenants protecting the business from being restructured out of your reach, and what happens on a change of control before the period ends.

Seller notes and deferred consideration

Cleaner in principle: fixed amount, fixed date, interest. The question is where you sit in the capital structure when things go badly. A deferred note that ranks behind a senior lender in a business now carrying five turns of debt is not a receivable; it is equity risk with a fixed upside.

Rollover equity

Increasingly the real bridge in sponsor deals. The seller keeps a stake and takes a second bite at exit. This can be genuinely good, it is often the highest-returning money a founder ever invests, but it is not a payment. Read the shareholders’ agreement rather than the headline percentage: what are the drag and tag provisions, is the rollover in the same instrument as the sponsor or behind a preference, and are there management incentive plan shares diluting you at the top?

Structured consideration on a milestone rather than a metric

Underused and often better than an earn-out. A payment triggered by a discrete, verifiable event (a contract renewal, a regulatory approval, a facility going live) is far harder to argue about than an EBITDA calculation across a changed cost base.

What sellers should do differently

Three things come up again and again.

Model the buyer’s model. Before you go to market, build the leveraged model a sponsor would build on your business, at today’s debt terms. If the equity return does not work at your price, you have a structural gap and you should know it before a banker tells you otherwise.

Get your own quality-of-earnings work done first. Sell-side diligence is not a luxury item. It moves adjustments out of the negotiation, where they cost you leverage, and into the data, where they cost you nothing.

Price the structure, not the headline. A lower all-cash number is frequently worth more than a higher number with forty per cent at risk over three years. Discount every deferred component for the risk you are actually taking, then compare offers on that basis. Most sellers do this arithmetic after signing.

What buyers should be honest about

Buyers who are winning processes right now are not the ones paying the most. They are the ones whose price does not move after diligence, whose conditionality is short, and who can explain their number in a way the seller can verify. Certainty has become a real component of value, and it is the only component a buyer can offer without touching their return.


General commentary on market practice. Not legal, financial or tax advice.