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Deal terms4 min read

The MAC clause almost never works, and that is the point

In twenty-five years only one buyer has walked away on a material adverse change and had a court agree. Sellers should still read the clause carefully, because what it excludes tells you who carries each risk.

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Deal structure and process

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A white stone civic building with a columned portico.

Key takeaways

  • Courts set the bar for a material adverse change extremely high. Akorn v Fresenius in 2018 was the first Delaware decision to let a buyer terminate on that ground.
  • The carve-outs are the substance of the clause. Industry conditions, economic conditions and changes in law are normally the buyer's risk, not the seller's.
  • 'Disproportionate effect' language claws some of that back: a general downturn counts if it hits this business harder than its peers.
  • Because termination almost never succeeds, the clause's real function is leverage over price between signing and completion.

Every purchase agreement signed between two sophisticated parties contains a clause allowing the buyer to walk away if something materially adverse happens to the business before completion. Almost none of them have ever been successfully used.

That is not a drafting failure. It tells you what the clause is for.

What the courts have actually said

The governing standard in Delaware, the jurisdiction most negotiated agreements reference, is that a material adverse change must be durationally significant, measured in years rather than quarters, and must substantially threaten the overall earnings potential of the target. A bad quarter does not qualify. Nor does a missed forecast, on its own.

In 2018 the Delaware Court of Chancery decided Akorn v Fresenius, permitting Fresenius to terminate its acquisition of Akorn. It was the first time a Delaware court had allowed a buyer out on MAC grounds, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed it that December.1 The facts were extreme: Akorn’s full-year EBITDA fell to $64m, an 86% decline year on year, and the court separately found serious data integrity failures in the company’s regulatory submissions. A breach of its compliance representations, which did work independently of the MAC finding.

The opinion is also the closest thing to a published yardstick. Reviewing the earlier cases, the court observed that most courts which have considered profit decreases in the range of 40% or higher have found a material adverse effect to have occurred.1 That is the order of magnitude a buyer has to be arguing about. Not a missed quarter, not a soft half-year.

The lesson sellers draw from that is usually the wrong one. The point is not that MAC clauses are now live. The point is how far a business had to fall before one bit.

The carve-outs are the clause

The headline sentence is generic. The negotiation happens in the exclusions, and that list is a risk allocation table in disguise.

Normally carved out: the buyer’s risk

  • General economic or financial market conditions
  • Conditions affecting the industry as a whole
  • Changes in law, regulation or accounting standards
  • Acts of war, terrorism, natural disaster, pandemic
  • Failure to meet internal projections, on its own
  • Effects of announcing or performing the transaction itself

Normally not carved out: the seller’s risk

  • The loss of a major customer specific to this business
  • Fraud, or a breach of a compliance representation
  • A liability that diligence did not surface

That allocation is the deal. A buyer agreeing to the standard carve-outs is accepting that it bears macro risk from the moment of signing, which in a long-dated transaction can be a year or more of exposure.

The sentence to look for

Most carve-outs are followed by a qualifier, and it reverses much of what came before: an industry-wide or economy-wide effect still counts if it has a disproportionate effect on the target relative to comparable businesses.

Read carefully, this is a reasonable allocation, a seller should not be released from an outcome that only happened to their business, and it is also the route back into the clause. A buyer arguing a MAC after a sector downturn will argue disproportionality, and whether the comparison set is “the industry” or “companies of this size in this niche” is a drafting question worth an afternoon.

Also worth checking: does the clause apply only to the business, or does it extend to the buyer’s ability to finance or complete? And is a failure to meet projections excluded entirely, or excluded “in and of itself”. The latter leaves the underlying cause available as evidence.

What the clause really does

Since termination almost never succeeds, the clause functions as leverage.

Between signing and completion, a buyer that believes it has a MAC argument does not usually litigate. It opens a conversation about price. The seller, committed, off the market, with a business whose uncertainty is now public, weighs a renegotiation against years of litigation against a counterparty it cannot force to complete in any practical sense.

That is why the clause matters even though it is never used, and why the things that sit next to it matter as much: a reverse termination fee that makes walking away expensive, a short gap between signing and completion, and conditions that are objective rather than judgemental.

For a private mid-market seller

Three things to take from this.

A short period between signing and completion is worth real money. Every week of gap is a week of MAC exposure and a week in which something can be argued.

Negotiate the carve-outs, not the headline. The sentence everyone reads is standard. The list underneath it is not.

Ask what happens if the buyer does not complete. In private deals the honest answer is usually nothing, which is a reason to think about a deposit or cost cover before signing rather than after.

Sources

  1. Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 2018-0300-JTL, memorandum opinion of 1 October 2018 (Delaware Court of Chancery, also at Justia), affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court on 7 December 2018. ↩ ↩2